Ideas from 'Truth by Convention' by Willard Quine [1935], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' by Quine,Willard [Harvard 1976,0-674-94837-8]].
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
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8996
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If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money...
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
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8995
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Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
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10064
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Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Musgrave]
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
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20296
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Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Rey]
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8998
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Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false
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8999
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Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions
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9000
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If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role?
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
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8994
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If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
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8997
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There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
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8993
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If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic
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